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We study the empirical determinants of China’s capital flight. In addition to the covered 
interest differential, our empirical exercise includes a rather exhaustive list of macroeconomic 
variables and a few institutional factors. Overall, our regression exercise shows that China’s 
capital flight is quite well explained by its own history and covered interest differentials. The 
other possible determinants offer relatively small additional explanatory power. It is also 
found that China’s capital flight responds differently to the components of covered interest 
differentials and to the positive and negative components of these variables. The response 
pattern, however, depends on the choice of data frequency. The general impression is that the 
monthly results are more intuitive than the quarterly ones. 
JEL-Code: F30, F32, G15. 
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1. Introduction 
In the midst of the current financial crisis, it is hard to under-estimate China’s role in the 
global economy. Since its open door policy was initiated in 1978, China has swiftly ascended to 
the league of major players in the world economy. Echoing its growing economic prowess, 
China has stepped up its interactions with the rest of the world apace.  
 Over the last two decades, China has strengthened its levels of trade and financial 
integration with the world economy, albeit at uneven paces. There is a plethora of analyses on 
China’s trade integration. These studies usually emphasize China’s supercharged export 
performance, the pressure of her demand on commodity prices, and the link between Chinese 
renminbi (RMB) valuation and global imbalances.
1 China’s ability to draw in huge amounts of 
foreign direct investment (FDI); especially compared with its role as a provider in the world 
capital market, and its astonishing rate of accumulating international reserves in the new 
millennium also have attracted consideration attention in both academic and policy circles.
2 
While a large collection of studies has accumulated in the last decade or so, there is still much to 
be done to understand the intricate relationship between China and the world economy. 
The current study examines China’s capital flight – an illicit financial channel through 
which China interacts with the world economy. Capital flight could be seen as a consequence of 
distortions induced by the political structure and the fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. 
Indeed, China’s capital flight is quite substantial. A quick check on the data shows that, in the 
2000s, quarterly illicit capital outflows and inflows could be larger than the official FDI or the 
change in the external debts in the corresponding period.  
Given its size, capital flight could have significant implications for the Chinese economy. 
For instance, it could adversely affect China’s economy by draining needed resources from the 
domestic market and reducing the effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies. Capital 
flight also has implications for China’s policy of further liberalizing its capital management 
policy. In general, a sudden and severe capital flight could inflict huge pains on an economy – 
the recent crises abound with examples of the detrimental impact of capital flight.
3 
                                                 
1   See, for example, Blanchard and Giavazz (2006), Cheung et al. (2007a, b), Feenstra and Wei (2009), Lane 
and Schmukler (2007), Obstfeld (2006), and  Rodrik (2006). 
2   See, for example, Eichengreen and Tong (2007), Cheung and Qian (2009), Jeanne (2007), Hale and Long 
(forthcoming), and Prasad and Wei (2007). 
3   See, for example, Harrigan et al. (2002), Pastor (1990), and Rojas-Suarez (1990).   2
Given China’s current stage of development and its proclaimed gradualism reform 
approach, one expects the conditions and environment that give rise to capital flight will exist 
and persist for awhile. The extant academic studies focus on measuring China’s capital flight and, 
at the same time, recognize a few determinants including exchange rate policy, preferential 
treatments for foreign capital, domestic and foreign return differentials; see, for example, Gunter 
(1996, 2004), Ljungwall and Wang (2008), Sicular (1998), and Wu and Tang (2000).
4 
One hurdle facing studies on capital flight is the measurement issue. There are different 
interpretations of the term capital flight. One definition equates capital flight to cross-border fund 
movements that are taken to evade official capital control regulations. In this case, capital flight 
has no official record and, thus, it is hard to make a precise assessment of the size of capital 
flight. In this study, we adopt a commonly used procedure called the World Bank residual 
method to assess the magnitude of capital flight. Essentially, the residual method measures the 
capital flight by the difference between the reported capital inflow and outflow. 
A key explanatory variable of our basic empirical framework is the covered interest 
differential, which measures the deviation from covered interest parity. The role of covered 
interest differentials is quite intuitive – one expects capital flight responds to covered interest 
differential advantages. The basic framework also include standard economic determinants such 
as exchange rate volatility, real GDP growth, external debts, fiscal deficit, openness, real estate 
market index, and international reserves.  
The basic framework will be extended in several directions. First, we introduce some 
China-specific institutional factors. The China-specific institutional factors include a political 
risk index, a dummy variable allowing for the effect of the US-China Strategic Economic 
Dialogue, a dummy variable for exchange rate policy reform, and a dummy variable tracking the 
evolution of China’s capital control policy. It is anticipated that these factors could signal the 
path of RMB exchange rate in the near future and, thus, affect capital flight. 
Second, we examine the presence of asymmetric responses to positive and negative 
covered returns. Outward and inward capital flights could be triggered by motivations other than 
searching for returns. For instance, in addition to capturing superior returns, outward capital 
flight is typical in developing countries for avoiding unfavorable political and economic 
                                                 
4   It is noted that the cointegration between capital flight and its determinants reported in Ljungwall and 
Wang (2008, Table 2) does not exist when the relevant finite sample critical values (Cheung and Lai, 1993) are used.   3
conditions. Thus, capital flight might respond differently to positive and negative covered 
interest differentials. 
Third, we will examine the role of expected RMB depreciation. The main difference 
between expected RMB depreciation (RMB forward premium) and covered interest parity 
deviation is given by the US and Chinese interest rate differential. One may argue that the use of 
covered interest parity deviation may be too stringent as it involves Chinese money markets that 
are not accessible to everyone. On the other hand, the off-shore non-deliverable RMB forwards 
are not (officially) subject to China’s jurisdiction and, thus, could be viewed as a market 
indicator of expected currency movement. According to standard theory, expected currency 
depreciation (appreciation) could trigger capital outflow (inflow). 
  Fourth, studies on capital flight based on the World Bank residual method usually 
examine quarterly capital flight data. It is because the residual method uses balance of payments 
statistics, which are typically available at the quarterly frequency, to calculate capital flight 
information. Since capital could be transferred electronically rather than physically in the 
modern world, it is not unreasonable to expect that capital flight could respond to changes in 
economic and political situations in a relatively short period of time. If it is the case, then a 
natural concern is that the use of quarterly data could make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
reveal the interactions between capital flight and its determinants. Thus, it could be instructive to 
examine capital flight behaviour at, say, the monthly frequency. To this end, we employ the 
Chow and Lin (1971) method to construct monthly capital flight data and compare the results 
from regression analyses based on quarterly and monthly capital flight data.  
 
2. Capital  Flight 
  The adverse effects of capital flight on the originating economy are quite well recognized 
in the literature.
5 The operational definition of capital flight, nonetheless, could be quite  elusive 
and it covers a wide spectrum. The main difference between alternative measures of capital flight 
is the types of capital flow included in their calculations. It should be noted that, despite the 
usual connotation of illegality, capital flight could, at least, technically speaking have taken place 
                                                 
5   See, for example, Boyce and Ndikumana(2001), Cuddington (1986), Dooley et al. (1986), Dornbusch 
(1984), and Khan and Haque (1987).    4
via either legal or illegal channels. Thus, these measures could be interpreted as estimates of 
unrecorded, instead of illegal, transactions. 
 




Figure 1 graphs the time profiles of China’s annual capital flight derived from the World 
Bank residual measure, the hot money measure, and the errors and omissions entry in the balance 
of payments statistics.
6 The residual measure is arguably the most commonly used measure in 
literature while the hot money measure is also often considered (Cuddington, 1986; World Bank, 
1985). While the errors and omissions entry mostly reflects the (net) unrecorded capital flow, it 
is a main component of other capital flight measures (Prasad and Wei, 2007). 
It is evidenced that these measures give a qualitatively similar portrait of the capital flight 
pattern. In essence, capital flight was relatively mild before the 1990. It started to pick up in the 
1990s and exhibited substantial swings in the new millennium. The World Bank residual method 
indicates some minute inward capital flight from 1985 to 1989 that could be induced by China’s 
                                                 
6   Another popular measure of capital flight is the Dooley approach, which is shown to be a variant of the 
residual approach (Claessens and Naudé, 1993; Dooley, 1986, 1988). Also, individual measures of capital flight 
could be combined to form new alternative measures; see for example, Claessens and Naudé (1993) and Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith (2008).    5
current account deficits in those years.
7 Another recorded inward capital flight occurs around 
2004 – explanations offered in the media often point to the intense market expectations about 
RMB appreciation and the bubbly Chinese real estate market in that period. Comparing the three 
measures, the World Bank residual method gives the most volatile measure of capital flight. 
 




To gauge its economic relevance, we plot China’s capital flight and FDI inflow 
normalized by its fixed assets investment in Figure 2. China’s fixed assets investment is deemed 
to be a crucial factor driving its phenomenal growth. The residual method shows that capital 
flight could be more than 20% of fixed assets investment. The FDI capital is another significant 
driving force behind China’s phenomenal growth. These ratios suggest that capital flight could 
easily offset, if not dwarf, FDI flow to China. The economic implication of China’s capital flight 
is quite obvious if the capital transferring out of China is as productive as FDI. 
With all its capital control measures in place, how could China have such volatile capital 
flight? Anecdotal evidence, indeed, has suggested that capital controls are always porous and 
(illicit) capital flows are not completely shut. A good share of historical capital movements 
occurs outside of formal regulations, as indicated by the errors and omissions entry of the 
                                                 
7   Gunter (2004) reports inward capital flight in 1985, but not for the 1986-1989 period. The difference could 
be due to data revision.   6
balance of payments statistics. Even in the early stage of China’s open door policy, capital flight 
is attributed to corrupted officials running state owned enterprises and beneficiaries of corruption 
and economic crimes. It is perceived that, taking advantage of regulatory loopholes, banks and 
corporations shuttle money in and out of the economy via, say, unrecorded cross-border 
transactions and mis-invoicing. Even China’s capital controls present significant barriers for 
capital movements, they are not watertight and, apparently, do not dampen capital flight over 
time. 
 
3. Empirical  Analyses 
The subsequent empirical analyses are based on capital flight data derived from the 
World Bank residual method, which is commonly adopted in empirical studies. A few 
advantages of the residual method are a) its broad coverage, b) it is intuitive, and c) it could be 
easily replicated.
8 In essence, the residual method obtains an indirect measure of capital flight by 
comparing the “sources of funds” and “uses of funds.” According to the World Bank residual 
method, capital flight is given by 
Capital flight = ∆ExD + NFDI – CAD – ∆IR, 
where ∆ExD is the change in external debts, NFDI is the net foreign direct investment; CAD is 
the current account deficit, and ∆IR is the change in international reserves. There is outward 
(inward) capital flight when the recorded sources of funds given by increases in external debts 
and net FDI inflow are larger (smaller) than the recorded uses of funds given by current account 
deficit and international reserve accumulation. A brief description of this method and some other 
measures of capital flight is given in the Appendix. 
When capital flight is positive, resources are leaving the country and not servicing the 
domestic economy. Alternatively, it reflects some disutility of domestic assets. When capital 




3.1 Basic  Model 
                                                 
8   See, for example, Claessens and Naudé (1993), Kant (1996), and Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) for a 
detailed description of various capital flight measures and their limitations. 
9   The media typically focuses on the “basic balance” given by NFDI – CAD. When the sum is in surplus, it 
means a net inflow of foreign exchange from the net trade proceeds and/or net foreign money into the economy for 
long-term investment, but these are not the total (portfolio) capital inflow.   7
  One framework for analyzing capital flight is offered by the portfolio balance approach 
(Cuddington, 1986; Diwan, 1989; Dornbusch, 1984). Intuitively, an economy tends to experience 
a capital drain when it offers a rate of return lower than the rest of the world. A persistent return 
differential, net of transaction costs, is only possible in the presence of capital controls. In the 
absence of perfect capital controls, return differentials induce capital flow but the flow is not 
strong enough to equalize domestic and foreign returns. To capture the idea, we consider the 
regression equation 
 F t = α + 
p
i Σ βiFt-i + 
q
i Σ λiCIDt-i + εt,        ( 1 )  
where Ft is the capital flight variable given by the stock of capital flight and CIDt is the covered 
interest differential that measures the deviation from covered interest parity between the Chinese 
RMB and the US dollar (US$).
10  
Our quarterly capital flight data are derived from the balance of payments statistics 
provided by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China. The stock of capital flight 
variable is obtained by compounding capital flight data using the US$ London interbank offer 
rates and then discounting the resulting series by the US inflation rates. The sample period is 
from 1999:Q1 to 2008:Q2, which is constrained by the availability of data required to construct 
the capital flight variable and data on other variables used in the subsequent analyses. The 
covered interest differential is calculated from the three-month RMB interbank offer rate, the 
three-month US$ London interbank offer rate, and the corresponding spot and non-deliverable 
forward rates of RMB against US$.
11  A larger covered interest differential represents a higher 
covered return on RMB investment.
12 See the Appendix for a detailed description of these and 
other variables used in the exercise. 
Technically speaking, equation (1) is an agnostic regression examining the (Granger) 
causal effect of covered interest differential on capital flight. The coefficient λi gives the change 
in Ft for a unit change in CIDt . The lagged Ft’s are included to control for spurious CIDt effects. 
Before estimating equation (1), the Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) ADF-GLS unit 
root test, which assumes the highest test power, was used to determine the stationarity properties 
                                                 
10   Studies examining the stock of capital flight include Collier et al. (1999), Cuddington (1987), and Rojas-
Suarez (1990). 
11   Non-deliverable forward markets are described in, for example, Ma et al. (2004). 
12   The covered interest differential is sometimes associated with capital controls or the threat of their 
imposition. In general, see, for example, Aliber (1973), Dooley and Isard (1980) and Frankel and Engel (1984), and 
in the content of China, see, for example, Cheung et al. (2003) and Ma and McCauley (2008).   8
of Ft and CIDt. Specifically, the ADF-GLS
τ test that allows for a linear time trend was used. The 
lag structure of the test was determined by the Bayesian information criterion. See Elliott, 
Rothenberg, Stock (1996) for a detailed discussion of the test procedure. The test statistics 
calculated from the Ft and CIDt series are, respectively, -3.052 and -3.406 – both are significant 
and reject the unit-root null hypothesis (Cheung and Lai, 1995). Thus, equation (1) is not a 
spurious regression. 
 
Table 1:  Empirical Capital Flight Equations 
 
  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F(-1)  0.920*** 0.916*** 0.968*** 0.911*** 0.947*** 0.960*** 0.925*** 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
CID(-1)  -0.074        
  (0.06)        
CID(-3)    -0.020*** -0.012* -0.015***  -0.016** -0.018**  -0.012* 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
dOPENNESS    0.485** 0.560** 0.484** 0.586**  0.613*** 0.464* 
    (0.19) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.24) 
Ex_R     0.025**      0.027** 
     (0.01)      (0.01) 
SED     0.029*     0.031 
     (0.02)    (0.02) 
RISK       -0.002    0.000 
       (0.00)  (0.00) 
CONTROL        -0.001  0.010 
        (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trend -0.003  -0.001***  -0.003***  -0.002***  -0.002  -0.003  -0.004* 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.152  0.032***  0.039***  0.045***  0.133  0.042*  0.058 
  (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.15) (0.02) (0.15) 
         
Adj.  R-squares  0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.88 
Obs.  37 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Q-stat(4)  6.09 3.09 6.82 3.99 4.68 4.12 6.91 
Q-stat(8)  7.51 3.73 8.12 8.87 8.49 7.05 9.52 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equations (1), (2) and (3). Column (2) gives results based 
on equation (1), column (3) gives results based on equation (2), and columns (4) to (8) report results 
based on equation (3). See the text for detail. Robust standard errors are given in the parentheses. “***”, 
“**” and “*” denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. “Q-stat(4)” and “Q-stat(8)” 
are the Box-Ljung Q-statistics calculated from the first 4 and 8 estimated residual autocorrelations. None 
of the Q-statistics is significant.   9
The results of estimating (1) are reported in the second column of Table 1. The covered 
interest differential variable, CID, has a negative coefficient estimate. That is, a large covered 
return on RMB investment reduces capital flight; a result that is consistent with the conventional 
wisdom. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimate has a t-statistic of -1.23 and is insignificant at the 
conventional 5% level. 
The use of quarterly data could also make it difficult to disentangle the covered interest 
differential effect if, for instance, capital flight adjusts in less than a quarter. Indeed, if the 
contemporaneous covered interest differential variable is included in the regression, it has a 
significant and negative estimate. Nonetheless, a contemporaneous association between Ft and 
CIDt does not offer an ambiguous interpretation of capital flight behavior. We explore the data 
frequency issue in the next sub-section.  
Equation (1) is arguably simplistic for modeling capital flight. The absence of the 
relevant determinants could bias the estimation results. To better understand capital flight 
behavior, we extend (1) by including standard economic determinants of capital flight. 
  Drawing from the extant theoretical and empirical studies, we considered the following 
economic determinants of capital flight: China’s real GDP growth rate, China’s government 
deficit normalized by its GDP, the difference between the US and China inflation rates, the 
change in China’s openness, the real estate investment return in China, and the change in China’s 
international reserves normalized by its GDP. The last three variables deserve some comments. 
First, openness captures the import and export activity. It is perceived that capital flight could be 
related to mis-invoicing of exports and imports, which is a common strategy to evade capital 
controls and to move money in and out of China. Second, on the real estate market index, the 
strong Shanghai property market is perceived to be a triggering factor for hot money flowing into 
China started in 2003. Third, in the recent years, the rapid build-up of international reserves has 
brought China the pressure to move capital to overseas and, conceivably, to ease the effort to 
curb capital flight. Thus, it would be interesting to determine the empirical relevance of these 
variables to China’s capital flight. 
A description of these variables and their sources is provided in the Appendix. The 
theoretical links between these economic variables and capital flight are discussed in, for   10
example, Cuddington (1986), Dooley (1988), Dornbusch (1984).
13 We estimate the regression 
equation 
Ft = α + 
p
i Σ βiFt-i + 
q
i Σ λiCIDt-i +   θ’Xt + εt,       ( 2 )  
where Xt is a vector containing economic variables. In a pilot study, we found that these 
economic variables are mostly insignificant when they were included jointly or individually in 
(2). It turned out that only the openness variable, dOPENNESS, is significant in our regression 
analysis; the results are presented in column (3) of Table 1. The insignificant results pertaining to 
the other economic variables are not reported for brevity and are available from the authors. 
  The openness variable has a positive and significant coefficient estimate. It is noted that 
capital flight through mis-invoicing may not show up in the balance of payments statistics. 
Nonetheless, it is widely perceived that trade mis-invoicing via under- and over-invoicing 
imports and exports is a main conduit for capital flight. If the motivation behind mis-invoicing is 
in line with the general one behind capital flight, then openness could bear some information on 
capital flight. A higher level of openness offers a better chance to manipulate the reported trade 
prices and the related capital flight. Our estimation results are in accordance with such an 
interpretation - an increase in openness implies an increase in capital flight.  
In the presence of the openness variable, the coefficient estimates of both the lagged 
capital flight and CID variables are smaller in magnitude. The CID variable is only significant at 
the third lag instead of the first one. The switch in the responding lag to three quarters is quite 
puzzling – does it take three quarters for capital movement to respond, on the margin, to a 
change in covered interest differential? We will come back to the CID lag structure later. 
 
3.2 Extensions 
In addition to economic variables, we consider some institutional factors that are specific 
to China. Specifically, we augment equation (2) with a dummy variable Ex_R that captures the 
July 2005 exchange rate policy reform, a dummy variable SED accounting for the effect of the 
US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,
14 a political risk index RISK, and a dummy variable 
                                                 
13   Also, see Boyce (1992), Conesa (1987); Cuddington (1986), Dooley (1986, 1988); Dornbusch (1984), 
Gibson and Tsakalotos (1993),  Lessard and Williamson (1987), Mikkelsen (1991), and Smit and Mocke (1991). 
14   The first Strategic Economic Dialogue took place in December 2006. The Dialogue was re-named the U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009; see http://www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china/index.shtml.   11
CONTROL tracking the evolution of China’s capital control policy.
15 These institutional factors, 
a priori, signify certain economic and political conditions that could affect capital flight.  Again, 
data on these factors are described in the Appendix. To accommodate these institutional factors, 
we modify equation (2) to  
Ft = α + 
p
i Σ βiFt-i + 
q
i Σ λiCIDt-i +  θ’Xt + ψ’Zt + εt,       ( 3 )  
where Zt is a vector containing institutional factors. 
The results of adding each one of these factors and all four of them together are presented 
in columns (4) to (8) in Table 1. Individually, the exchange rate policy and Strategic Economic 
Dialogue variables have a positively significant impact and the two other factors have a negative 
but insignificant effect on capital flight.  
The exchange rate policy variable effect is in accordance with the anecdotal evidence that 
the policy change released the pressure of a one-off sharp appreciation. Recall that the policy 
change announced on July 21
st, 2005 was a long-anticipated one and was accompanied by one-
off 2.1% revaluation. Since then, the jump risk of RMB is quite small and not a factor deterring 
capital flight. The positive effect of the Strategic Economic Dialogues variable effect is likely 
attributed to stern statements and the uncertainty related to the Dialogue’s outcomes. 
When the four factors are jointly included in the regression, the exchange rate policy 
dummy variable is the only significant institutional factor – indicating the implication of the 
policy change dominates the other three factors. 
  In general, the adjusted R-squares statistics that measure the goodness of fit suggest that 
the specifications based on the standard economic determinants and the selected China-specific 
factors perform quite well. All the reported models have an adjusted R-squares statistic larger 
than 80%. The marginal explanatory power of the openness and institutional variables, 
nonetheless, seems low. 
In the remaining part of this sub-section, we explore two additional features that could 
shed some further insight about China’s capital flight. 
Historically, capital flight appears to be a more prominent phenomenon in developing 
than in developed economies. To be sure developed economies experience capital flight – but it 
is usually associated with, say, money laundering that allows criminals to transfer gains from 
illegal activities including drug dealing and tax evasion. Besides money laundering, capital flight 
                                                 
15   See, for example, Prasad and Wei (2007) and Hung (2008) for China’s capital control policy.   12
in developing economies is designated to circumvent capital controls, and to benefit favourable 
economic and political climates in overseas markets. Thus, the illicit capital movement in 
developing economies would be biased towards outward instead of inward capital flight.
16 In 
view of this, we anticipate China’s capital flight could display asymmetric responses to positive 
and negative covered returns on RMB. 
 
Table 2:   Empirical Capital Flight Equations – Asymmetric CID effects 
 
   (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
F(-1)  0.909*** 0.931*** 0.897*** 0.925*** 0.926***  0.913*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) 
CID(+,-3)  -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008  -0.011 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
CID(-,-3) -0.036***  -0.029  -0.024*  -0.032**  -0.041***  -0.020 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) 
dOPENNESS  0.520** 0.570** 0.491** 0.574** 0.615**  0.503* 
  (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)  (0.25) 
Ex_Reform  0.005       0.018 
    (0.03)      (0.03) 
SED     0.024*     0.029* 
     (0.01)     (0.02) 
RISK       0.000    0.000 
       (0.00)   (0.00) 
CONTROL       0.011  0.012 
       (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trend -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002**  -0.002  -0.004*  -0.004* 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Constant 0.030**  0.034**  0.037**  0.031  0.055*  0.062 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03)  (0.16) 
         
Adj.  R-squares  0.88 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87  0.87 
Obs.  35 35 35 35 35  35 
Q-stat(4)  6.28 6.29 7.08 5.80 6.21  7.04 
Q-stat(8)  8.34 9.55  10.66  7.47 7.12  9.82 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equations (1), (2) and (3) with the CID variable replaced 
by its positive and negative components. See the Note to Table 1. 
                                                 
16   China’s data on outward and inward capital flight could be distorted by capital round-tripping, which refers 
to transferring capital illicitly out of China and then investing it back in the country via, say, Hong Kong, in order to 
take advantage of preferential tax concessions offered to foreign capital. See, for example, Tseng and Zebregs (2002) 
and World Bank (2002).   13
We define the variables 
+
t CID ≡  max[CIDt, 0] and  t CID
−  ≡  min[CIDt, 0] and use them to 
assess the asymmetric response of China’s capital flight to covered interest differentials. The 
results of estimating equations (1), (2), and (3), with CIDt replaced by 
+
t CID  and  t CID
− , are 
presented in Table 2. The coefficient estimates of  t CID
−  are larger in magnitude than the 
corresponding ones of 
+
t CID  and, with two exceptions, are statistically significant.  In essence, 
the results indicate that a negative covered return on RMB has a stronger impact on capital flight 
than a positive covered return. 
Comparing Tables 1 and 2, the use of 
+
t CID  and  t CID
−  instead of CIDt does not lead to 
substantial changes in the coefficient estimates of the lagged capital flight and openness 
variables. The noticeable change in institutional factor effects is that the SED variable becomes 
the only significant institutional variable. 
The second additional feature is related to the role of expected RMB valuation. 
Discussions of capital flight routinely refer to the role of currency speculation. Theoretically, the 
currency speculation effect should be accounted for by the covered return differential variable 
which is the sum of an interest differential component and an expected RMB depreciation 
component given by a RMB premium. However, one may argue that the use of covered interest 
parity deviation may not be relevant because the Chinese money market is not readily accessible 
to everyone. Further, in the early 2000s, it is perceived that speculation on RMB revaluation was 
a main factor driving capital movements. China’s capital flight could, thus, respond differently to 
interest differentials and RMB expectations.  
To investigate the individual roles of its components, we re-estimate equations (1), (2), 
and (3) with CIDt replaced by RDIFFt and PREMt, where RDIFFt is the three-month RMB 
interbank offer rate minus the three-month US$ London interbank offer rate and PREMt is the 
three-month RMB premium derived from off-shore non-deliverable forward and spot rates. The 
off-shore non-deliverable RMB forwards are not (officially) subject to China’s jurisdiction and, 
thus, could be viewed as a market indicator of expected currency movement. Table 3 presents the 
estimation results. 
Both RDIFFt and PREMt garner a negative coefficient estimates, indicating capital flight 
is discouraged by either a favourable interest rate differential or exchange rate premium. For 
each specification, the coefficient estimate of the PREMt variable is much larger (in magnitude)   14
than that of RDIFFt. Nevertheless, PREMt is insignificant in all the cases presented in the Table. 
RDIFFt, on the other hand, is significant in the absence of institutional factors and significant in 
three out of five other cases. Contrary to the hyped RMB revaluation effect in the early 2000s, 
the covered interest differential effect on quarterly capital flight is mainly driven by the interest 
differential RDIFFt variable. 
 
Table 3.  Empirical Capital Flight Equations – Interest Rate and Forward Premium Effects 
 
   (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F(-1)  0.949***  0.973***  0.902*** 0.938*** 0.955*** 0.921*** 
    (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
PREM(-1)  -0.015  -0.013  -0.014 -0.020 -0.020 -0.012 
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
RDIFF(-1) -0.005**  -0.002*  -0.004**  -0.003* -0.003  -0.002 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dOPENNESS 0.456**  0.432*  0.333  0.445**  0.447**  0.329 
    (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) 
Ex_R    0.030***       0.023** 
     (0.01)       (0.01) 
SED     0.033**      0.029 
      (0.02)      (0.02) 
RISK       -0.003**    -0.001 
        (0.00)  (0.00) 
CONTROL         -0.012  0.004 
          (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trend  0.001  0.000  0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.009  0.002  0.000  0.197*  -0.026  0.066 
    (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.15) 
            
Adj.  R-squares  0.86  0.88  0.89 0.87 0.87 0.89 
Obs.  37  37  37 37 37 37 
Q-stat(4)  2.10  5.06  2.31 3.56 2.59 5.26 
Q-stat(8)  5.69  6.56  7.15 9.17 6.86 8.72 
 
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equations (1), (2) and (3) with the CID variable 
replaced by its interest rate differential and forward premium components. See the Note to Table 1. 
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Table 4:  Empirical Capital Flight Equations – Combined Specifications 
 
   (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
F(-1)  0.961*** 0.974*** 0.902*** 0.940*** 0.955*** 0.914*** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
PREM(+,-1) -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
PREM(-,-1) -0.025 -0.007 -0.011 -0.018 -0.014 0.007 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
RDIFF(+,-1) -0.009**  -0.006**  -0.009**  -0.007  -0.007  -0.006** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
RDIFF(-,-1)  -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
dOPENNESS 0.474**  0.458*  0.360  0.470**  0.479**  0.358 
    (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) 
Ex_R    0.032**      0.027** 
     (0.01)      (0.01) 
SED     0.035*     0.032 
      (0.02)    (0.02) 
RISK       -0.003*    0.000 
        (0.00)    (0.00) 
CONTROL        -0.016  -0.004 
         (0.01)  (0.01) 
Trend  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -0.006 0.011 0.010 0.203*  -0.021 0.042 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03) (0.15) 
          
Adj.  R-squares  0.86 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.89 
Obs.  37 37 37 37 37 37 
Q-stat(4)  5.27 6.18 4.07 5.14 4.39 6.93 
Q-stat(8)  9.94  7.59 10.44  11.05 9.00 13.15 
  
Note: The table reports the results of estimating equations (1), (2) and (3) with the CID variable replaced 
by the positive and negative interest rate differential and forward premium components. See the Note to 
Table 1. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating model specifications that allow for asymmetric 
responses to positive and negative interest differentials and forward premiums, where 
+
t RDIFF ≡ 
max[RDIFFt, 0],  t RDIFF
−  ≡ min[RDIFFt, 0], 
+
t PREM ≡ max[PREMt, 0], and  t PREM
− ≡ 
min[PREMt, 0].    16
  Similar to Table 3, the coefficient estimates of 
+
t PREM and  t PREM
− are typically larger 
(in magnitude) than the corresponding coefficient estimates of 
+
t RDIFF  and  t RDIFF
− . Among 
the four components of covered interest differential, it is 
+
t RDIFF that has a significant 
coefficient estimate in the absence of institutional factors and is significant in three out of five 
other cases. That is, when the Chinese interest rate is higher than the corresponding US rate, 
there is a slowdown in capital flight. The result, however, is different from the one in Table 2, 
which indicates a statistically significant change in capital flight occurs when China experiences 
a negative covered return differential. 
  A few observations from Tables 1 to 4 are in order. First, the capital flight variable 
displays considerable persistence. Second, trade openness is the main economic variable that has 
a statistically significant implication for capital flight. Third, the significance of selected 
institutional factors depends on specification. Fourth, the adjusted R-squares estimates show that 
the selected macroeconomic and institutional regressors offer some marginal explanatory power. 
The incremental improvement is, however, quite limited as these estimates are typically in the 
range of 83% to 89%. Fifth, the covered return differential variable is in most cases significant 
only with a lag of three quarters. On the other hand, its components; namely the interest 
differential and RMB premium, affect capital flight with only a one quarter lag. The concern is, 
of course, how long does it take to move capital in and out the country. The capital flight is also 
found to respond asymmetrically to covered interest differentials and their components.  
 
3.3 Monthly  data 
  Most studies on capital flight rely on quarterly data that are typically retrieved from the 
balance of payments statistics. Depending on its speed of adjustment to changes in political and 
economic conditions, capital flight’s reactions to its determinants might not be accurately 
revealed using quarterly data. Higher frequency data, say, monthly data, could offer a finer grid 
to gauge the information about capital flight behavior and better capture the interaction between 
capital flight and its determinants. In our exercise, monthly data are not available only for the 
capital flight and GDP variables. Thus, if we could construct monthly capital flight and GDP 
data from their quarterly counterparts and re-estimate various capital flight regression equations, 
we could have an alternative perspective on China’s capital flight behavior.   17
The method detailed in Chow and Lin (1971) is used to interpolate monthly data from the 
corresponding quarterly ones. Essentially, information from monthly data on comparable and 
related variables is used to obtain the monthly capital flight and GDP data from the 
corresponding quarterly data. Wilcox (1983), for example, reports that the Chow and Lin method 
can successfully recover the essential dynamic characteristics of a data series, including 
autocorrelation structure and turning points. The data construction procedure is described in the 
Appendix. The constructed monthly capital flight and GDP data and other monthly data series 
were then used to study capital flight behavior. The results of using the monthly data to re-
estimate capital flight equations are reported in Tables 5 to 8, which are presented in a format 
similar to Tables 1 to 4.  
  There are a few differences between the monthly and quarterly results. First, the sum of 
lagged capital flight coefficient estimates obtained from the monthly data is smaller than the 
corresponding one from the quarterly data. One possible interpretation is that the estimated 
persistence of monthly capital flight is lower than the one of quarterly data. It is noted that 
quarterly capital flight displays a single lag structure while two lagged capital flight variables are 
significant in the case of monthly data. Thus, it is likely that, in this case, quarterly data are too 
coarse to reveal temporal interactions and they over-state persistence.   
  Second, the responses of monthly capital flight to the cover interest differential and its 
related variables are different from those of quarterly capital flight. In Tables 5 to 8, the covered 
interest differential variable, CIDt, and its derivatives including 
+
t CID ,  t CID
− , RDIFFt, 
PREMt,
+
t RDIFF ,  t RDIFF
− , 
+
t PREM , and  t PREM
− are found to significantly affect capital flight 
with a one-month time lag. In a world when capital could move via various channels including 
electronic means, a response rate of one month appears not unlikely. For quarterly data, the 
effect of the covered interest differential variable and its derivatives is significant with a one-
quarter or a three-quarter lag; a response lag that seems a bit long in the context of the modern 
capital market. 
  Besides the response time, there are other discernable differences. In Table 5, the 
monthly overall covered interest differential effect given by CIDt is negative and is significant in 
only three of the seven cases. Nonetheless, these monthly estimates are in general larger (in 
magnitude) than the corresponding ones in Table 1. 
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Table 5.  Empirical Capital Flight Equations, Monthly data 
   (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F(-1)  0.569*** 0.536*** 0.532*** 0.536*** 0.536*** 0.532*** 0.526***
    (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
F(-2)  0.296*** 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.340*** 0.333***
    (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
CID(-1) -0.029*  -0.024 -0.031* -0.024 -0.025 -0.028  -0.031*
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
dIR(-1)    -0.191* -0.196*** -0.193* -0.191* -0.195* -0.207*
     (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Ex_R    -0.010       -0.009
     (0.01)       (0.02)
SED     0.003       0.006
      (0.01)       (0.01)
RISK       0.000     -0.001
        (0.00)     (0.00)
CONTROL        0.005  0.008
         (0.01)  (0.01)
Trend 0.000  0.000* 0.001* 0.000* 0.000 0.000  0.000
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant  -0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.014 0.004 0.087
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.13)
                 
Adj.R-squares  0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68
Obs.  112 112 112 112 112 112 112
Q-stat(12)  10.72    17.72 17.62 18.21 17.44 16.72    17.74 
Q-stat(24)  26.17    23.01 23.01 23.35 22.65 21.69    23.81 
 
Note: The table reports the results of using monthly data to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3). See the 
Note to Table 1 for detail.   19
 
Table 6.  Empirical Capital Flight Equations – Asymmetric CID effects, Monthly Data 
   (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F(-1)  0.505*** 0.505*** 0.506*** 0.500*** 0.504*** 0.498***
    (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
F(-2)  0.321*** 0.320*** 0.316*** 0.318*** 0.319*** 0.309***
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
CID(+,-1)  -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.050***
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CID(-,-1)  0.022 0.019 0.025 0.034 0.034 0.031
    (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
dIR(-1)  -0.182* -0.184* -0.187* -0.182* -0.176* -0.189*
    (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Ex_R    -0.003       -0.011
     (0.01)       (0.01)
SED     0.010       0.009
      (0.01)       (0.01)
RISK       -0.001     -0.001
        (0.00)     (0.00)
CONTROL        -0.005  -0.003
         (0.01)  (0.01)
Trend  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant  0.018 0.016 0.020 0.104 0.017 0.094
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.12)
                
Adj.R-squares  0.71    0.70 0.71 0.71 0.71    0.70 
Obs.  112 112 112 112 112 112
Q-stat(12)  17.47    16.99 17.02 18.20 18.08    17.85 
Q-stat(24)  22.46    21.58 23.23 23.17 22.85    26.04 
 
Note: The table reports the results of using monthly data to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) with the 
CID variable replaced by its positive and negative components. See the Note to Table 2.   20
 
Table 7.  Empirical Capital Flight Equations – Interest Rate and Forward Premium Effects, 
Monthly data 
   (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F(-1) 0.531***  0.532*** 0.532*** 0.528*** 0.533***  0.527***
   (0.13)  (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)
F(-2) 0.318***  0.318*** 0.316*** 0.312*** 0.316***  0.311***
   (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)
PREM(-1) -0.234**  -0.231** -0.234** -0.242** -0.241**  -0.240**
   (0.10)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.10)
RDIFF(-1) 0.000  0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001  0.001
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
dIR(-1) -0.191*  -0.190* -0.193* -0.193* -0.188*  -0.196*
   (0.10)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.11)
Ex_R    0.000       -0.001
     (0.03)       (0.01)
SED     0.004       0.002
      (0.01)       (0.01)
RISK       -0.002     -0.002
        (0.00)     (0.00)
CONTROL        -0.003  0.002
         (0.01)  (0.01)
Trend 0.001**  0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*  0.001*
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Constant -0.005  -0.005 -0.005 0.094 -0.008  0.114
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.02)  (0.13)
                
Adj.R-squares  0.70    0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70    0.69 
Obs. 112  112 112 112 112  112
Q-stat(12)  15.39    15.52 16.22 16.39 15.69    16.70 
Q-stat(24)  19.74    19.87 20.37 20.88 20.09    21.10 
 
Note: The table reports the results of using monthly data to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) with the 
CID variable replaced by its interest rate differential and forward premium components. See the Note to 
Table 3.   21
Table 8.  Empirical Capital Flight Equations – Combined Specifications, Monthly Data 
   (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F(-1) 0.505***  0.504*** 0.505*** 0.495*** 0.505***  0.496***
   (0.14)  (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)  (0.14)
F(-2) 0.292***  0.291*** 0.287*** 0.278*** 0.283***  0.275***
   (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)
PREM(+,-1) -0.286***  -0.278*** -0.289*** -0.298*** -0.308***  -0.298***
   (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.09)
PREM(-,-1) 0.170  0.231 0.188 0.225 0.214  0.280
   (0.19)  (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18)  (0.18)
RDIFF(+,1) -0.007  -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005  -0.001
   (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
RDIFF(-,-1) 0.002  0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.003
   (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
dIR(-1) -0.176*  -0.168* -0.181* -0.175* -0.165*  -0.168*
   (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10)
Ex_R    0.012       0.009
     (0.01)       (0.01)
SED     0.010       0.005
      (0.01)       (0.01)
RISK       -0.003*     -0.002
        (0.00)     (0.00)
CONTROL        -0.009  -0.003
         (0.01)  (0.01)
Trend 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001*  0.000
   (0.00 )  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
Constant 0.020  0.027 0.021 0.180* 0.012  0.151
   (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02)  (0.13)
                
Adj.R-squares 0.71    0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71    0.71 
Obs. 112  112 112 112 112  112
Q-stat(12)  15.74  14.98 17.30 16.50 16.46    16.96 
Q-stat(24)  20.49  19.77 21.78 21.81 21.69    22.23 
 
Note: The table reports the results of using monthly data to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) with the 
CID variable replaced by the positive and negative interest rate differential and forward premium 
components. See the Note to Table 4. 
 
Monthly capital flight, similar to quarterly capital flight, responds asymmetrically to 
positive and negative covered interest differentials. However, monthly capital flight is found to 
respond to positive, but not negative, covered interest differentials in a statistically significant   22
manner. That is, when the covered interest is in favour of Chinese RMB, there is a slowdown or 
even a reverse of outward capital flight. This result is in sharp contrast to the finding in Table 2 
that quarterly capital flight is significantly affected by negative, instead of positive, covered 
interest differentials. Apparently, the monthly results are in line with the media hype about the 
hot money flows to China in anticipation of RMB appreciation and dramatic growth 
opportunities. 
  The monthly interest differential and RMB premium effects are also different from those 
reported for quarterly data. In Table 7, it is clear that the covered interest differential effect is 
mainly driven by the premium component. The coefficient estimates of PREMt are significant 
and larger (in magnitude) than those of CIDt in Table 5 while RDIFFt has small and insignificant 
estimates. Again, the finding derived from monthly data, instead of quarterly data, lends support 
to the anecdotes that are quite common in the media on hot money influx triggered by, among 
other factors, expected RMB appreciation. 
  The asymmetric effects presented in Table 8 are in accordance with the results in Table 6 
and 7; namely, it is mainly the positive return to RMB holdings given by non-delivery forward 
premiums that has a significant impact on monthly capital flight. These results reinforce the 
finding that the monthly and quarterly capital flight data reveal different sources of the covered 
interest differential effect. 
  Comparing the results in Tables 5 and 8, we note that the effects of the covered interest 
differential and its related variables on monthly capital flight data are quite consistent across the 
specifications under consideration. The estimated covered interest differential effect is negative 
and is driven by returns in favor of RMB. Further it is the premium component rather than the 
interest differential component that affects capital flight. 
  The quarterly data, on the other hand, give some conflicting messages about the covered 
interest differential effect. For instance, the response time shifts from one quarter to three 
quarters when a macroeconomic variable is introduced (see columns (2) and (3) in Table 1), and 
then reverts back to one quarter when its components RDIFFt and PREMt are considered (see 
Tables 3 and 4). Further the quarterly results are ambiguous on whether the capital flight is 
affected by positive or negative covered interest differentials – results in Table 2 are suggestive 
of negative ones while those in Table 4 are indicative of positive ones. One possible explanation 
of imprecision is that the number of quarterly observations is quite small. Another possible   23
explanation is that the ambiguity arises because the quarterly frequency may be too coarse to 
fully capture the adjustment mechanism that could have taken place in less than three months. 
   On balance, the monthly covered interest differential effects are more intuitive and 
appealing than the quarterly ones. A caveat is that the monthly capital flight data are derived 
(interpolated) from the quarterly data. Even though established standard statistical procedures are 
used to construct the data, there is no guarantee that these monthly data represent the true, but 
unobservable, underlying monthly capital flight dynamics. Thus, we should interpret these 
results with caution. 
  Third, in the case of monthly data, the only statistically significant macroeconomic 
variable is, dIR, the international reserve variable. Specifically, an increase in international 
reserves (per GDP) deters capital flight. An increase in China’s international reserves is typically 
associated with an increase in trade surplus and an increase in the economic and political 
pressures on RMB appreciation – these two factors are perceived to curb capital flight. The 
interesting observation is that the international reserve variable is significant in the presence of 
RMB premiums, other macroeconomic variables, and the selected institutional factors. 
  Fourth, with one exception, the four selected institutional factors are insignificant; either 
when they were included in the regression one at a time or as a group. The only significant case 
is given by the RISK variable in Table 8 with a negative coefficient estimate indicating a low 
level of political risk implies a low level of capital flight. 
 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
We study the empirical determinants of China’s capital flight. In addition to the key 
covered interest differential variable, our empirical exercise includes macroeconomic economic 
variables that are commonly considered in the literature and a few institutional factors. The 
results on covered interest differential effect are largely in accordance with the conventional 
wisdom – a favorable covered interest differential deters capital flight. Our exercise, nonetheless, 
shows that the specifics of the covered interest differential effect depend on whether monthly or 
quarterly data are considered. The monthly data, compared with quarterly data, offer results that 
are quite consistent across specifications examined and in line with the media anecdotes on 
capital flight and expected RMB appreciation.   24
One result we do not expect is the limited impact of standard macroeconomic factors. 
Among a rather exhaustive list of macroeconomic variables, we only identify a few that are 
significant in China’s capital flight regressions. Specifically, quarterly capital flight data are 
significantly affected by a trade openness variable while monthly capital flight is significantly 
affected by an international reserve variable. The relevance of the selected institutional factors 
depends on both data frequency and regression specification. In general, the selected institutional 
factors do not offer a substantial marginal explanatory power even when they are significant; 
indeed, they are insignificant in most of the monthly specifications. 
Overall, our regression exercise shows that China’s capital flight – both at the quarterly 
or monthly frequency – is quite well explained by its own history and covered interest 
differentials. The other possible determinants offer relatively small incremental explanatory 
power. Our estimation results highlight the role of data frequency – different data frequencies 
could have some significant implications for the empirical capital flight behavior. For the current 
exercise, we consider the monthly results more intuitive than the quarterly ones. 
 It is believed that capital flight could adversely affect China’s economy by diverting the 
needed resources and reducing the effectiveness of monetary and exchange rate policies. It also 
has implications for China’s approach of further liberalizing capital management policy. With its 
proclaimed gradualism approach to economic reform, we do not expect China to implement 
dramatic measures in a fast pace to curtail capital controls and open up its capital account. Thus, 
we expect capital flight, even in the presence of official controls, will display its persistence in 
the near future.  
Gradual policy changes, however, would reduce the need for moving capital around in an 
illicit manner. For instance, on July 13, 2009, the China’s State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange issued new rules that make it easier for both Chinese and foreign corporations to move 
foreign exchanges to overseas. The change is part of China’s continuing efforts to liberalize 
foreign exchange controls. We anticipate that these changes in control measures, even they occur 
slowly, will remove some of the motivations behind the current capital flight and, thus, reduce its 
magnitude and economic impacts.  25 
 
Appendix A:  Data - Definition and Sources 
 
F  The stock of China’s capital flight in trillion US$. The US dollar LIBORs are 
used to compound capital flight data and the compounded series is adjusted by the 
US inflation rates. The World Bank residual method is used to construct the 
capital flight data. The required balance of payments data are obtained from the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of China.  
CID  The covered interest differential. It is given by (1+r) – (F/S)(1+r*), where r is the 
Chinese interbank offer rate (CHIBOR), r* is the US$ LIBOR, F is the renminbi 
non-deliverable forward  rate (yuan/$); and S is the spot exchange rate (yuan/$). 
For the quarterly data exercise, CHIBOR, LIBOR, and F are 3-month rates. For 
the monthly data exercise, they are 1-month rates. Data are retrieved from CEIC. 
RGDPG  China’s real GDP growth rate calculated from seasonal adjusted data from CEIC. 
FISC  China’s government deficit scaled by GDP. (Data source: CEIC) 
dIR  China’s international reserve changes scaled by GDP. (Data source: CEIC) 
REAL  The return of China’s index of real estate investment. (Data source: CEIC) 
dOPENNESS  The change of China’s trade openness scaled by GDP. The openness is given by 
the sum of seasonally adjusted imports and exports (Data source: CEIC) 
INFL  The difference between the Chinese and US inflation rates. (Data source: CEIC) 
Ex_R  A dummy variable for China’s July, 2005 exchange rate policy reform, I(t>=July, 
2005). 
SED  A dummy variable for the semi-yearly Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) 
between the US and Chinese Governments, starting from Dec. 2006. The variable 
is set equal to 1 in the month (quarter) when the SED takes place.  
RISK  China’s Political Risk Index - a higher value means a lower level of political risk. 
(Data Source: ICRG)
CONTROL  A dummy variable to capture the timing of China’s capital control policy changes. 
It is assigned a value of -1 for the observations before Sept. 2001, when China 
tightened capital outflow; a value 0 for the observations between Sept. 2001 and 
Oct. 2002, when it is deemed as a transition period; and a value +1 for the 
observations after Oct. 2002, when Chinese authorities starts to encourage or 
promote capital outflow.  
RDIFF  Interest rate differential. The data is calculated by subtracting the US$ LIBOR 
from CHIBOR. 
PREM  The renminbi non-deliverable forward premium given by, ( )/ tk t t NDF e e + − , 
where  t NDF  and  t e are, respectively, non-deliverable forward and spot rates 
expressed as the price of renminbi. The 90-day and 30-day forwards are used in, 
respectively, quarterly and monthly data regressions. 
Trend   A time trend variable. 
 
Note: The change of a variable is used when it itself is I(1). 26 
 
 
Appendix B: Measuring  Capital  Flight 
Various measures of capital flight are introduced in the literature. In this Appendix, we 
briefly discuss three commonly used measures. 
 
1.  The World Bank residual measure, World Bank (1985) 
The measure compares the sources of the funds and the uses of funds reported in a 
country’s balance of payments statistics. If all fund movements are recorded appropriately, the 
double-entry accounting practice should ensure that the uses of funds equal the sources of funds.  
The World Bank residual method, thus, defines capital flight as 
Capital flight = ∆ExD + NFDI – CAD – ∆IR, 
where ∆ExD is the change in external debts, NFDI is the net foreign direct investment; CAD is 
the current account deficit, and ∆IR is the change in international reserves. There is outward 
(inward) capital flight when the recorded sources of funds given by increases in external debts 
and net FDI inflow are larger (less) than the recorded uses of funds given by current account 
deficit and international reserve accumulation. Note that this measure of capital flight 
incorporates all foreign assets and liabilities incurred by both public and private sectors. 
 
2.  The private claim measure, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986) and Conesa 
(1986) 
In essence, the measure assumes the banking system is not involved in capital flight 
activity. It could be written as  
Capital flightprivate claim = ΔExD + NFDI – CAD – ΔIR – stBFA 
where stBFA is the short-term foreign assets in the banking system. By excluding foreign assets 
in the banking sector, the measure focuses on the non-bank private sector behavior. 
 
3.   The “hot money” measure, Cuddington (1986) 
The measure emphasizes the role short-term capital in defining capital flight. It is given 
by  
 Capital flighthot money = stNB + E & O 27 
 
where stNB is the non-bank private short-term capital outflow and  E & O is the errors and 
omissions entry reported in the balance of payments account. The errors and omissions term is a 
common measure of unrecorded capital movement. 
  
Most of the other capital flight measures are variants of one of these three measures. One 
major type of variants incorporates trade mis-invoicing. For more detailed discussions of various 
measures of capital flight and their limitations, see, for example, Claessens and Naudé (1993), 
Deppler and Williamson (1987), Dooley (1986), Kant (1986), and Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008).   28 
 
 
Appendix C:  Constructing the monthly capital flight and GDP data 
In the text, we use the Chow and Lin (1971) method, which is built upon Chang and Liu 
(1951), to extract the information to construct monthly capital flight and GDP data.  For example, 
to construct the monthly GDP series, the Chow and Lin method uses information on variables 
that are closely related to GDP and, at the same time, available on the monthly frequency. 
Usually, these monthly variables are components of GDP.  Wilcox (1983), for example, reports 
that the Chow and Lin method can successfully recover the essential dynamic characteristics of a 
data series, including autocorrelation structure and turning points. 
The residual method based capital flight is given by  
Capital flight = ∆ExD + NFDI – CAD – ∆IR. 
Monthly data on international reserves are available. Thus, we have to construct the monthly data 
on  CAD, NFDI, and ∆ExD. In our exercise, data on China’s trade balance are used to derive the 
monthly current account balance. The net FDI series is derived using data on inward FDI. The 
monthly external debt series is derived from the regression framework given in Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981) with a dummy variable capturing China’s Qualified Foreign Institutional 
Investor program that was instituted in 2002 and allows designated foreign entities to participate 
in the local Chinese stock markets.  
  For the GDP data, only data on the aggregate consumption component are not available 
at the monthly frequency. Thus, we derived monthly consumption data using information on 
monthly retail sales on consumer goods, and the consumption of transportation and 
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